I. INTRODUCTION
A trade secret is proprietary information that confers a competitive advantage on its owner. It often concerns a manufacturing process or a product design. But unlike a patent, a trade secret is protected not by a statutory grant of exclusive ownership conditioned on public disclosure, but rather by nondisclosure and continued secrecy. Section 39 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines a trade secret as "any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others." 1 The classic example of a trade secret is the recipe for Coca-Cola.
If someone-such as a competitor, former employee, or licensee-steals a trade secret, the owner of the secret is entitled to a remedy that may include, in addition to damages, an injunction that forbids the thief from manufacturing a product that employs the owner's secret. 2 Courts disagree over whether such an injunction should continue after the trade secret 
explaining that a trade secret is "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it"), and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1974 REV. 797 (1977) . In addition, the theft of a trade secret by a foreign person or entity constitutes a federal crime under the Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831.
becomes public knowledge-for example, through its owner's filing of a patent application or through his marketing of the product incorporating the secret. 3 Even when courts agree that the injunction should continue after the trade secret becomes public, they still disagree over whether the injunction against the trade secret thief should be perpetual or limited in duration. 4 Three cases from three different federal circuits exemplify this controversy. In Shellmar Products Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 5 the Seventh Circuit in 1936 perpetually enjoined the thief from using the innovator's trade secrets even after the innovator's public disclosure of those secrets had enabled others to use the (former) secrets lawfully without the innovator's consent. At the other extreme, in Conmar Products Co. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 6 the Second Circuit, in a 1949 opinion by Judge Learned Hand, enjoined the thief only until public disclosure occurred. Even under Conmar, however, the thief may not raise public knowledge as a defense to a perpetual injunction if his own misappropriation destroyed the secrecy of the information. 7 Finally, in Winston Research Corp. v 
. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.
8 the Ninth Circuit in 1965 enjoined the thief after public disclosure had occurred, but only for as long as the court estimated that it would have taken the thief lawfully to reverse engineer the secret. Although a split therefore exists between the circuits, that split has not elicited-and need not elicit-a resolution of the issue by the Supreme Court because trade secret law is state law.
presumption that the Conmar rule shall apply. California's version of the UTSA, for example, provides: "Upon application to the court, an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the injunction may be continued for an additional period of time in order to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation."
11 However, the UTSA gives no guidance as to what facts are relevant to rebutting that presumption, what the burden of proof is, or how one would calculate the proper duration of the additional amount of time for the injunction to run. Although the comments to the UTSA give further support to applying Conmar, their rationale is questionable, as will become apparent.
The choice of injunction rule takes on special significant in light of the recent growth of the "inevitable disclosure" doctrine. Some jurisdictions have used the "threatened misappropriation" wording found in both the UTSA and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition to create a presumption that a former employee has, in certain circumstances, inevitably used without permission the proprietary information of his former employer. 12 This article endeavors to resolve the conflict regarding the proper duration of an injunction to remedy the misappropriation of trade secrets. Part II examines the Supreme Court's evolving economic rationale for the existence of trade secret protection, beginning from the axiom that trade secret remedies should advance the same policies that motivate the substantive rights established by trade secret law.
Part III explains why the theft of a secret process differs in economic effect from the theft of a secret product design. Courts have neglected the important economic distinction between secret processes and secret product designs when fashioning injunctive relief in trade secret cases.
Part IV explains how trade secret misappropriation exemplifies involuntary exchange. Trade secrets result from sunk investment in risky innovative activity. Given uncertainty and asymmetric information, an insider's opportunity to steal a trade secret resembles a real option in the theory of corporate finance.
Part V introduces a Schumpeterian framework for analyzing trade secret misappropriation, which involves a cycle of innovation, theft, disclosure, and exploitation over time. Competition is "Schumpeterian" when firms compete to achieve positions of temporary market dominance from which they may be displaced by the next wave of product innovations. This view of 11 . E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West Supp. 2000) . 12. See, e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1271 (7th Cir. 1995) ("PepsiCo finds itself in the position of a coach, one of whose players has left, playbook in hand, to join the opposing team before the big game.").
sequential competition for the market is based on Joseph Schumpeter's familiar concept of "creative destruction." 13 Part VI use this Schumpeterian framework to analyze Conmar (and the related default rule under the UTSA), Winston Research, and Shellmar. This analysis indicates that the optimal duration of an injunction should be proportional to the option value implicit in the theft of the trade secret, which in turn will increase with the extent of sunk costs associated with the trade secret and with the riskiness of investment in innovative activity in the relevant market. In this respect, none of the existing doctrinal approaches or the USTA default rule reflects correct economic analysis. The optimal standard is likely to produce outcomes that would fall between the Shellmar and Winston Research rules in terms of the duration of the injunction. 14 However, because the option value of trade secret misappropriation would be difficult for litigants to calculate and a court to evaluate in a given case, a reasonable proxy is the Shellmar rule. The imposition of a perpetual injunction would induce the innovator and thief to enter post-trial licensing negotiations under circumstances in which the thief had no bargaining power. As a consequence, the innovator would license the trade secret at its full opportunity cost, which would incorporate his best estimate of the option value associated with the thief's knowledge and exploitation of the secret before its public disclosure.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S EVOLVING ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR TRADE SECRET LAW
To fashion the optimal injunctive remedy for trade secret misappropriation, one must start with a clear understanding of the legal and economic justification for the common law protection afforded trade secrets. 14. Apart from these three injunction rules emerging from discrete strands of judicial decisions, a fourth possible rule may have evolved outside the judicial process entirely. It is curious that the reported trade secret injunction cases do not involve some of the most technologically dynamic industries, such as software, computers, semiconductors, and telecommunications equipment. One possibility is that an extralegal norm has emerged in such industries not to litigate cases of trade secret misappropriation. Ronald Gilson has suggested a related hypothesis: that the unofficial rule against trade secret litigation derives not from industry standards, but from the inadequacy of legal remedies available within a particular jurisdiction. See Ronald J. Gilson 575, 602 (1999) . He argues that an intellectual externality has resulted in Silicon Valley that has produced a thriving "high-velocity labor market" that encourages "an engine of continuous innovation." Id. at 590-91. It is outside the scope of this article to examine the possibility that extralegal norms in high-technology areas substitute for enforcement of trade secrets through litigation.
Questions like "How broad is the definition of a trade secret?" or "What conduct constitutes misappropriation?" are unintelligible if answered without regard to the question "How do trade secret remedies advance the objectives of trade secret law?" 15 Of course, this last question requires recognition of the objectives of trade secret law.
Section 757 of the first Restatement of Torts asserted in 1939 that, unlike a patent monopoly, trade secret protection "is not based on a policy of rewarding or otherwise encouraging the development of secret processes or devices," but instead "is merely [directed] against breach of faith and reprehensible means of learning another's secret."
16 Section 757 stated: "One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so is liable to the other if (a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him, or (c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other, or (d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that its disclosure was made to him by mistake." 17 The Restatement's premise-that trade secret protection rests on a theory of tortious breach of a confidential relationship or upon a theory of an express or implied contract of confidentiality-reflected the Supreme Court's 1917 decision in E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v.
Masland.
18 There, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote for the Court, "The word 'property,' as applied to . . . trade secrets, is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith."
19 To Holmes, "the starting point" in a trade secret case was "not property or due process law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs." .com/abstract_id=421340 ("The fact that the information is not shared with a single soul does not strip it of legal protection. Rather, the contrary seems to be true . . . . After all, we do not say that someone becomes the owner of property because he has leased it; rather the reverse is true: because he is the owner, he is normally in a position to lease the property.").
22 533-34 (1967) . Writing shortly after the Court's decision, Paul Goldstein, Closing Circle, supra note 22, at 93, observed that, "while the Kewanee opinion referred to the state law's primarily economic motive for analogical purposes, the measure of the state law it ultimately took was not of the law's economic objective but of its economic effects, regardless of motive." He proposed that courts "measure the economic effect of other state laws which, though their objectives are predominantly and sometimes exclusively noneconomic, nonetheless bear significantly on the same national interests in competition endorsed in Kewanee." Id. On the "dispersion of responsibilities" rationale articulated in Kewanee, see David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secrets, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 61, 67 (1991) ("[I]f the law refuses to enforce contracts in which employees promise not to spill the employer's trade secrets, employers may be led to reorganize their businesses in inefficient forms-perhaps by splitting up tasks among dissemination of information because the innovator can license his secrets to others, confident that he has an enforceable right to that intellectual property. 26 This effect should, in turn, enhance the innovator's incentive to make sunk investments in R&D that might produce new technology whose patentability is inherently uncertain. This legal protection also should prevent wasteful expenditures on excessive plant security.
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Kewanee took an ex ante view of the innovation process rather than an ex post view. The Court recognized that, in an uncertain world, trade secret protection provides the innovator a safety net if his investment in R&D fails to produce valuable information that rises, with relatively high likelihood, to a patentable form: "Trade secret law encourages the development and exploitation of those items of lesser or different invention than might be accorded protection under the patent laws, but which items still have an important part to play in the technological and scientific advancement of the Nation." 28 In this sense, trade secret law and patent law serve identical purposes through complementary means. Trade secret protection encourages technological innovation by creating, through the definition of an enforceable property right, an incentive to make sunk investments in the creation of appropriable information. 29 It seems axiomatic that remedies for trade secret misappropriation ought to be designed to achieve that effect also.
30
Since Kewanee, the Supreme Court has reiterated its conception of trade secret protection as a system of property rights intended to encourage innovation. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. in 1984, the Court explicitly recognized a trade secret as property for purposes of the Takings Clause. 34 Justice O'Connor reiterated in Bonito Boats that "the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through disclosure."
35 Would-be innovators and inventors, however, cannot always be certain that the final fruits of their R&D efforts would be patentable. Trade secret law serves as a safety net for such investment. It assures innovators that, even if they do not expect to receive patent protection for the fruits of their sunk investment in R&D, the product of that investment will nevertheless enjoy some legal protection. Justice O'Connor observed: "The protections of state trade secret law are most effective at the developmental stage, before a product has been marketed and the threat of reverse engineering becomes real. During this period, patentability will often be an uncertain prospect, and to a certain extent, the protection offered by trade secret law may 'dovetail' with the incentives created by the federal patent monopoly." 36 Moreover, compelling competitors to engage in reverse engineering also stimulates greater innovation because the exercise of reverse engineering sometimes yields new discoveries. "Reverse engineering of chemical and mechanical articles in the public domain," noted Justice O'Connor, "often leads to significant advances in technology." 37 As noted earlier, trade secret law is state law. From Masland to the present, therefore, the Supreme Court's articulation of the rationale for trade 32 What implication does that ex ante view have for the formulation of remedies for the misappropriation of trade secrets? If trade secret injunctions are intended to preserve the incentive to make sunk investments in innovative activities, they must restore the reward for successful innovation, which corresponds to the innovator's economic rent. The theft of a trade secret appropriates the quasi rents with which the innovator would recover his sunk costs in specialized investments in new technology. 39 Trade secret misappropriation resembles the problem of contractual opportunism 40 or regulatory holdup. 41 The analogy is to the real option value inherent in a party's right to breach a contract and thereby expropriate the other party's quasi rent, 42 or to the option of an access seeker in a regime of mandatory network unbundling to compel the use of another's property at an artificially low, regulated price.
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As Part IV will more fully explain, trade secret theft extracts rents that the innovator otherwise would legitimately earn. stole the trade secret depresses the price that the innovator may lawfully charge; the returns to the trade secret thief that exceed his incremental costs represent an ex post expropriation of the innovator's legitimate recovery of, and competitive return on, his sunk investment. With such theft, the innovator would not have faced a positive expected value when deciding whether to make his original investment. Hence, the innovator never would have made the sunk investment in the project that created the opportunity for the trade secret theft.
III. DESIGN THEFT VERSUS PROCESS THEFT
A trade secret enables a firm to obtain an advantage over competitors that do not know or are not permitted to use such information. This ability gives the trade secret owner the opportunity to earn quasi rents and perhaps also economic rents. That is, it gives the innovator upward pricing flexibility, which is to say the ability to price above marginal cost for a sustained period of time.
Because of the existence of sunk costs, one cannot correctly equate upward pricing flexibility with market power. In the absence of sunk costs, the degree of economic power can be measured usefully by the size of the difference between price and marginal cost. Both price and marginal cost depend on the firm's output. Because a firm generally will produce the level of output that maximizes profit, economic power should be measured at this output. The firm's profit-maximizing output in turn depends on the market's price elasticity of demand, the firm's own market share, and the price elasticity of supply for the other firms in the market. Thus, for a given marginal cost function for the firm, these three factors determine the magnitude of the firm's economic rent. 44 In the presence of sunk costs, however, this conventional measure is ambiguous because it does not discriminate monopoly rent from either quasi rent or transient entrepreneurial rents derived from innovation. 45 A downward shift in the firm's marginal cost function also will allow the firm to exact economic rent if competitors do not experience the same cost savings and thereupon lower prices to equal the new marginal cost of production. Courts have failed to recognize that a secret process influences the magnitude of the innovator's available rents differently than does a secret product design. Consider first the economic effects of misappropriation of process secrets. An analysis of the economic effects of product design secrets then follows.
A. Process Secrets
A secret process gives the innovator a lower marginal cost (and a lower average variable cost) function than his rivals, holding constant all other information regarding production. In a static sense (which ignores long-run incentives for investment and innovation), the value to society of the secret process is the savings that would result if all firms in the industry employed that process. 46 This amount also would be equal to the maximum profit to the innovator (less transactions costs) if he could license the secret process to all his competitors before public disclosure of the secret permitted it to become freely available.
By stealing a secret process, a firm lowers its marginal cost of production to that of the innovator and avoids the sunk cost of developing the process independently (or of purchasing a blanket license or per-unit license to use it). The trade secret thief will maximize profit by charging the price corresponding to the output where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Assuming that the trade secret thief and the innovator have equal access to all other technologies for production, the thief's avoidance of these sunk licensing or R&D costs enables him to price only as low as the innovator's marginal cost. Thus, if the trade secret thief prices at marginal cost, misappropriation does not enable him to underprice the innovator, let alone monopolize the market. 47 Nonetheless, it is common for an innovator to allege in trade secret litigation that the misappropriation of a process secret has enabled the thief to underprice the innovator. 48 How can this result occur? If the trade secret thief in fact charges a lower price than the innovator, it must be because the innovator continues to price above marginal cost (presumably up to long-run average incremental cost). 49 In other words, the trade secret thief is able to underprice the innovator only if the innovator persists in attempting to recover the sunk costs of his investment that created the trade secret. That is, the trade secret thief cannot underprice the innovator unless the innovator tries to earn quasi rents with which to recoup the sunk costs of his investment that has produced valuable information.
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In addition to this expropriation of the innovator's quasi rents, misappropriation of a secret process reduces the innovator's ability to price above marginal cost by increasing the elasticity of supply of rival firms exploiting the formerly secret process. This loss of upward pricing flexibility is of the same magnitude as if the innovator had been able to license its secret process to rivals-except, of course, that the innovator receives as a reward only the cost savings on his own output rather than the cost savings on the entire industry's output.
B. Product Design Secrets
A secret product design gives the innovator upward pricing flexibility in a different manner than does a secret process. A secret design confers on the innovator's product either low consumer substitutability, or both low consumer substitutability and low producer substitutability. Stated differently, it is useful to consider two categories of economic effects resulting from the theft of a product secret. These two categories raise the underlying question of whether trade secret remedies give the same protection when proprietary information arises from novel flashes of insight as they do when proprietary information arises from substantial and sustained investment in R&D. Consider first the case of designs that result from costly investment.
Suppose that someone steals secret product designs that are too complex to be reverse engineered without a substantial investment of time, labor, and physical capital. The subsequent marketing of a copy of the innovator's product has three distinct economic consequences. First, it flattens the innovator's (residual) demand curve in direct relation to the share of the market that the trade secret thief supplies. This result simply reflects that the innovator has lost upward pricing flexibility-and hence the opportunity to earn economic rent and perhaps also quasi rent-because of increased consumer substitutability.
Second, the trade secret thief gains the consumer demand that the innovator lost. The degree to which this shifted demand for the thief's version of the product remains relatively price-inelastic depends on how well the innovator and the thief alike prevent the design's further disclosure or discovery (through either subsequent theft or reverse engineering). 50 . There is a possible scenario under which the thief can underprice the innovator, though it seems improbable. If the stolen process has substantial economies of scale (or substantial economies from cumulative output, as from learning-by-doing), and if the thief beats the innovator to market with a product that employs that stolen process, then the thief could have a lower marginal cost than the innovator.
Third, the trade secret thief avoids sunk costs of R&D that the innovator incurred-which, as shown earlier, gives the thief a lower average total cost schedule than the innovator, holding constant all other information regarding production. However, because the marginal cost of using the secret product design is zero for both the trade secret thief and the innovator, the thief's marginal cost of production will not be lower than the innovator's. Nonetheless, the trade secret thief will be able to underprice the innovator if the latter seeks to recover its sunk costs of R&D by charging a price that is high enough to earn quasi rents. Now consider a novel design. It may be more likely than a costly technical design to result from inspired genius or luck rather than prolonged R&D. Nonetheless, the design brings into being a new product for which no reasonable substitutes currently exist-or, at least, a product highly differentiated from currently marketed substitutes. An example is the removable, self-stick note pad manufactured by Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing (3M) and sold since at least the early 1980s under the "Postit" trade name.
51 Virtually all upward pricing flexibility that 3M might have enjoyed with respect to this product surely resulted from low consumer substitutability. As the innovator, 3M temporarily controlled 100 percent of the market for a relatively price-inelastic product. Yet the simplicity of the design-and the fact that any "secret" inherent in the design was immediately disclosed by the mere marketing of the product-implied that, at trivial cost, rival firms could (and did) reverse engineer the product and market substitutes. In this instance, producer substitutability rather than consumer substitutability constrained the innovator's upward pricing flexibility over time.
In the case of novel designs, misappropriation of the product design will not give the trade secret thief any significant advantage because the sunk costs necessary to duplicate the innovator's design are already trivial. Moreover, the marginal cost of production for both the thief and the innovator will be equal, by hypothesis. Nonetheless, misappropriation of the novel product design will flatten the innovator's residual demand curve in a shorter period of time than would the inevitable flood of substitutes supplied by imitators who lawfully copied the self-evident and formerly secret design.
Writing in 1934, the Sixth Circuit reasoned in A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co. that a secret design resulting from a flash of insight is no less entitled to trade secret protection than is a secret design requiring costly investment:
The mere fact that the means by which a discovery is made are obvious, that experimentation which leads from known factors to an 51. "Post-it" is a registered trademark of 3M, but the product's packaging bears no patent notice.
ascertainable but presently unknown result may be simple, we think cannot destroy the value of the discovery to one who makes it, or advantage the competitor who by unfair means, or as the beneficiary of a broken faith, obtains the desired knowledge without himself paying the price in labor, money, or machines expended by the discoverer. Facts of great value may, like the lost purse upon the highway, lie along unnoticed upon the public commons. Hundreds pass by, till one more observant than the rest makes discovery. 52 The Restatement of Torts in 1939 also seemed to distinguish novel designs from costly but more seemingly inevitable ones that resulted from extensive R&D. The Restatement suggested that a "novel invention" would more deserve a perpetual injunction if misappropriated than would a "mechanical improvement" that a legitimate imitator-the so-called "good mechanic"-could easily reverse engineer:
The nature of the secret is . . . an important factor in determining the kind of relief that is appropriate against one who is subject to liability [for trade secret misappropriation]. Thus, if the secret consists of a device or process which is a novel invention, one who acquires the secret wrongfully is ordinarily enjoined from further use of it and is required to account for the profits derived from his past use. If, on the other hand, the secret consists of mechanical improvements that a good mechanic can make without resort to the secret, the wrongdoer's liability may be limited to damages, and an injunction against future use of the improvements made with the aid of the secret may be inappropriate.
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These early views of trade secret remedies seem to accord greater deference to creative genius than to laborious investment in R&D, perhaps on the unstated premise that creativity is scarcer than the human and physical capital necessary to innovate improvements on prior embodiments of valuable information. From an economic perspective, however, greater explanatory power comes from analyzing this doctrinal distinction in terms of sunk costs and real options, as Part IV will show.
IV. THE OPTION VALUE OF INVOLUNTARY EXCHANGE
The voluntary exchange inherent in market transactions enhances social welfare because it makes both buyer and seller better off. The transaction constitutes a Pareto improvement in welfare. This result holds even when the seller is a monopolist. In a world of scarce resources, the selection of one transaction implies a decision to reject or forgo others. Unless both the buyer and the seller agree to terms, no transaction will occur. By its very nature, voluntary exchange increases social welfare. Virtually all of microeconomic theory, however, rests on the assumption that parties engage in voluntary exchange. Discussions of involuntary exchange are absent from nearly all microeconomics textbooks. Nonetheless, we routinely observe several distinct forms of involuntary exchange.
One form of involuntary exchange occurs between the government and a private party. In these transactions, a large and diffuse body of economic agents are the intended beneficiaries. Examples are eminent domain, taxation, conscription, and opportunistic use of rate regulation of public utilities. In each case, one can find an externality justification for government imposition of an involuntary transaction on private parties. It may be the need to produce a public good, such as a highway, through the use of a highly specialized or localized asset (eminent domain). Or perhaps the need to provide national defense (conscription) or to fund more generally the production of national defense and other public goods (taxation). Or it may be the need to abate an externality such as air pollution, through land-use restrictions. This is certainly not to say that an involuntary transaction is the only means to achieve the desired governmental objective. Rather, it is simply to say that government compulsion is rationalized in each of these cases as a remedy for an external cost or free-rider problem. Several constitutional provisions regulate this form of involuntary transaction, either generically or specifically-the requirement of just compensation for takings of property, 54 the right to refrain from self-incrimination, 55 and the limitation on the quartering of soldiers immediately come to mind. 56 A second form of involuntary exchange encompasses transactions between private parties and the government that specify other private parties as the immediate third-party beneficiary. Examples are compulsory licensing of copyrighted works, the essential facilities doctrine and related doctrines of forced sharing in antitrust law, and mandatory unbundling of telecommunications networks. Curiously, this form of involuntary exchange is not subject to any significant constraint under current judicial interpretation of the Constitution. 57 A third form of involuntary exchange concerns transactions between private parties. Through the law of crimes and the law of torts, AngloAmerican common law evolved as a social institution to address the consequences of involuntary exchange. The crime of robbery and the tort of conversion are after-the-fact attempts to rectify a transaction that arose from involuntary exchange-for example, because of the use or threat of violence, or because of the use of deception or unauthorized access to another's property.
The misappropriation of a trade secret is another example of this third form of involuntary exchange. 58 It is the use, without compensation, of valuable information created by someone else. Moreover, one can characterize trade secret misappropriation as a real option to exploit another party's private innovation. That information concerns not only the technologies that the trade secret thief can profitably pursue, but also the technologies that have been revealed-through another party's trial and error-to be unsuccessful and thus should be avoided. 59 The distortion caused by the theft of a trade secret is exacerbated if a large portion of the assets required to create and exploit the secret is sunk.
Stated differently, because a person cannot redeploy the sunk investment that is required to discover a trade secret, it pays for him to "wait and see" how well other investments in that industry have performed before committing himself to investing his own capital. 60 Conversely, the thief can wait to see whether a particular technology belonging to another is worth stealing. Joseph Anton and Dennis Yao argue that "the amount of the innovator's disclosure is critical to the imitation decision." 61 In the case of trade secret theft, the amount of "disclosure" to the thief is total. The option value of involuntary exchange becomes especially large in Schumpeterian industries, where different competing technologies make it possible that one firm will leapfrog others. In such an industry, the decision to invest today is especially risky, because it may commit a firm to a particular technology that may reveal itself later to be inferior. The imitator, therefore, actually enjoys a "second-mover" advantage, for he can shift the risk of sunk investment in a new technology onto the innovator.
In other words, for the thief the option value of involuntary exchange encompasses the ability to concentrate on stealing only the fruitful results of someone else's risky investment. Although Conmar, Winston Research, and 58. Friedman, Landes & Posner, supra note 25, at 69-70, argue that trade secret theft is distinguishable from intentional tort or crime when "the 'thief' brings about a social gainapproximated by the reduction in cost or improvement in quality that is brought about by greater competition as a result of breaking the trade-secret owner's information monopoly." They note, however, that reverse engineering is a superior substitute for theft as a means of discerning a trade secret. Id. at 70. They could have added, as Part V will explain, that the short-term social gain from trade secret theft would be significant only if (1) a long time elapsed between the theft and the secret's public disclosure and (2) no lawful imitators promptly emerged as competitors at the time of disclosure. 59. Cf. Anton & Yao, supra note 29, at 2 ("[I]f an innovation were known a priori to be minor, a competitor might prefer to remain with existing technology rather than imitate and risk legal damages.").
60. See Hausman & Sidak, supra note 43. 61. Anton & Yao, supra note 29, at 2.
Shellmar do not fully recognize the value of this second-mover advantage, the very definition of a trade secret does make this recognition in the sense that it presupposes that the secret information is "sufficiently valuable . . . to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others." 62 If a secret were instead insufficiently valuable in this sense, then its misappropriation would support at most some lesser cause of action, such as the tort of trespass or conversion. Thus, a matter of legal definition that borders on a tautology actually highlights the selection bias inherent in the kind of proprietary information being misappropriated.
One can measure the value of the option to wait before making a sunk investment. Avinash Dixit and Robert Pindyck have estimated that the markup on the cost of capital that is necessary to account for the sunk nature of investment varies from investment to investment, but is often at least two hundred percent. 63 Stated differently, any project entailing significant sunk costs that yielded an expected return of between 100 and 200 percent of the cost of capital would no longer be justified. This analysis is applicable to trade secret theft-or to any form of involuntary exchange, for that matter. The misappropriation of a trade secret truncates the innovator's returns in the "good state" of the world. That truncation of positive returns is especially harmful when one considers that the sunken nature of investment in innovation raises the hurdle rate for investments. Investment in trade secrets typically entails not only investment in specialized capital equipment, but also investment in specialized labor-as is underscored by the fact that many trade secret cases involve former employees as defendants. Those labor costs are inherently and completely sunk once the expenditure on specialized labor is made. Because a firm cannot recover the resources invested in a failed sunk-cost investment and shift them to an alternative project, that risk will create a disincentive for the firm to invest in innovative activities, in the absence of adequate trade secret protection.
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The Dixit-Pindyck model explains the behavior of innovative firms in high-technology industries. Such firms face incentives, in addition to those related to the sunkeness of the investment, for delaying deployment of innovative processes and products. These incentives include the rapidity of technological change and the declining costs across cumulative outputs that inhere in many industries (such as those associated with computer hardware and software technologies). In the face of rapid technological change, a firm has a strong incentive, in addition to the incentive arising from the sunkeness of the investment, to delay investment as long as competitive forces will permit. A simple example illustrates the point. The traditional view in microeconomic theory was that one should invest in any project that has a positive net present value of cash flows. Real option theory, however, shows that it may be better to wait if possible until some uncertainty is resolved and cost reduction can be achieved. That reduction in uncertainty is precisely the advantage that the trade secret thief enjoys. Assume initially, however, that the process of innovation is random across firms; firms do not select ex ante to be innovators or thieves of proprietary intellectual property. Consider, for example, a firm that traditionally builds routers for data networks. The firm must decide whether to develop a new dense-wave multiplexing technology for routers that costs, say, $1 billion today but has an uncertain return tomorrow. Suppose that, if the demand for the new routers is high, the firm will make $4 billion in profit. If, on the other hand, there is a bad outcome and the demand for the new routers is low, then the new technology will be unproductive, and the firm will gain nothing from owning it. If the probability of each outcome is 0.5, then the expected net cash flow of investing in the development of the new technology is, ignoring discounting, calculated as follows: (0.5 x $4 billion) + (0.5 x $0) − $1 billion = $1 billion.
Because the project has a positive expected net cash flow, one might think it optimal for the firm to take the role of the innovator-that is, make the investment today to develop the new technology. But that decision actually is not optimal. If the firm can delay making the investment, it can reduce the risk of bad outcomes by observing the experience of others and capturing the gains associated with deploying the superior technology later. The value of waiting is that the firm preserves the option not to make the investment of $1 billion if the bad state of the world occurs. To continue with the previous numerical example, the expected net cash flow of investing in the new technology after the market has witnessed its commercial success is, again ignoring discounting, calculated as follows: (1.0 x $4 billion) + (0.0 x $0) − $1 billion = $3 billion. In other words, the firm may decide that it is more profitable to pursue a strategy of being an imitator of new technology rather than an innovator. By waiting, the firm would increase its expected return. If the firm invests in developing new technology today, it sacrifices an option to invest tomorrow in imitating that new technology.
The choice facing the trade secret thief is even more favorable than that facing the imitator because the thief avoids making the $1 billion sunk investment to develop the secret product or process. Hence, the value to the thief of waiting to market a product containing the stolen trade secret is, again ignoring discounting, calculated as follows: (1.0 x $4 billion) + (0.0 x $0) − $0 = $4 billion. Of course, this calculation does not incorporate the expected value of any damages that the thief subsequently may be ordered to pay the innovator. But what if the thief chooses not to wait to market a product? After all, he does not face the choice of whether or not to make a sunk investment. If the trade secret thief markets a product when there is still uncertainty about the innovator's new technology, his expected net cash flow is, ignoring discounting, calculated as follows: (0.5 x $4 billion) + (0.5 x $0) − $0 = $2 billion. In this numerical example, trade secret theft is still more attractive than investment in innovation.
V. A SCHUMPETERIAN FRAMEWORK FOR TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION
The salient economic characteristics of trade secret protection can be seen in a simple model of innovation, theft, disclosure, and exploitation over time. That model shows the differences between the several different legal rules for enjoining one who has misappropriated a trade secret.
A patent may be regarded as the right of an innovator to deny use of his publicly disclosed invention for the term of the patent unless the user pays a specified royalty that is acceptable to the innovator. Trade secret protection is more limited. It enables the innovator to condition a third party's use of an undisclosed invention or body of information upon the payment of a royalty, but only until the secret has been disclosed to the public. 65 Thereafter, the royalty rate falls to zero, because the innovator no longer has the legal right to enjoin a third party's use of the secret. After disclosure, the only party whom the innovator might have the right to enjoin from using the trade secret is, depending on the applicable legal rule, someone who misappropriated the trade secret before its public disclosure.
To formalize this relationship, consider the following stylized facts and nomenclature, which are depicted in Figure 1 . At time t 0 , an innovator makes a sunk investment, which immediately results in the creation of valuable proprietary information entitled to trade secret protection. For simplicity, assume initially that the trade secret concerns a product design rather than a production process. (We will later relax this assumption.) The innovator operates in a Schumpeterian market, such that "winner takes all" or "winner takes most" competition occurs through technological innovation. Firms compete sequentially for the market, rather than simultaneously for share within a well-defined market. 65 . As a matter of antitrust law, there is no legal barrier to "the owner of a trade secret . . . [being able to] collect royalties even after the trade secret has 'expired' through public disclosure." ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 985 (4th ed. 1997). Whether the owner of the (former) secret can successfully do so as an economic matter is a different question.
The Schumpeterian market is neither technologically static, nor does it have mature, predictable consumer demand. But the Schumpeterian market does face the prospect of interim competition through imitation: Between cycles of Schumpeterian displacement, there arises generic imitation of the innovator's technology and the product embodying the resulting design. In such a market, the extent to which imitation denies the innovator the opportunity to earn quasi rents will depend on whether or not the innovator's technology turns out to be patentable, which in turn will dictate the innovator's relative bargaining strength in licensing negotiations with wouldbe imitators. In the extreme case, the innovator's product will embody proprietary but nonpatentable information; as noted above, the royalty rate for such information upon its public disclosure will immediately fall to zero, as the innovator will have no legal rights, and thus no bargaining power, to condition use of the proprietary information on the payment of a mutually satisfactory royalty. Assume that, at time t 1 , a person learns the trade secret while it is still confidential, and that the person begins to act upon that information. For example, the person could be an employee who learns of his employer's new designs for proprietary products or processes. Assume for simplicity that the thief immediately quits his job and clandestinely begins to compete against his former employer (the innovator) through the unauthorized and uncompensated use of the employer's trade secret.
Assume further that, at time t 2 , the innovator begins to market the new product embodying the trade secret, and thus the innovator publicly discloses the trade secret through marketing efforts or a patent application. The disclosure fully reveals to the public the value of the trade secret. At an immediate royalty rate of zero for the now-disclosed trade secret, entry by n imitators occurs immediately. Of course, if the government ultimately issues a patent for the trade secret, the innovator will be able to enjoin the n imitators from using the invention embodying the (former) trade secret unless they pay a royalty that is acceptable to the innovator.
Entrants, however, cannot immediately bring to market their products that embody the innovator's former trade secret. Some set-up time is required. A lag thus ensues during which the n imitators produce their own generic substitutes for the innovator's product. At time t 3 , the lag ends, when the imitators are ready to bring to market their own versions of the innovator's product. Assume that a Cournot equilibrium immediately drives down the price of the product incorporating the former trade secret to marginal cost, which by assumption is equal across all n + 1 firms in the market because of their identical access to the relevant production technology.
66 (Recall the initial assumption that the trade secret embodies a product design, not a production process.) As a consequence of the Cournot equilibrium, the innovator is denied any further opportunity to earn quasi rents on his proprietary information.
Finally, assume that, at time t 4 , another firm introduces a product that embodies a new and different proprietary technology. Regardless of whether that new technology is entitled to patent protection or merely trade secret protection, assume that the product employing that new proprietary technology constitutes for consumers a substantial improvement in price and performance. An example might be the replacement of daisy-wheel impact printers with laser printers. A new round of Schumpeterian displacement thus occurs in the market, and the proprietary technology developed by the first innovator at time t 0 is now worthless. The life cycle of the product embodying that proprietary technology has ended. Stated differently, at time t 4 , the innovator would not object to conveying, or allowing any one of the n lawful imitators to convey, to a trade secret thief the proprietary technology that the thief had previously misappropriated at time t 1 and may or may not have been enjoined from using in the interim. That willingness on the part of the innovator in the previous Schumpeterian cycle (from t 0 to t 4 ) now to engage in voluntary exchange with the trade secret thief arises because the technology is obsolete: If, hypothetically, voluntary exchange were to occur at time t 4 , it would occur at a price of zero. If the trade secret concerns a production process rather than a product design, the analysis changes slightly in a manner more favorable to the thief. The thief can begin using the process at time t 1 and can market a product embodying that process before time t 2 if he can prevent others (particularly the innovator) from learning of the misappropriation. In other words, the thief may be able to beat the innovator to market.
VI. PLACING THE INJUNCTION RULES WITHIN THE SCHUMPETERIAN FRAMEWORK
Within this economic framework we can now identify where, along the continuum in Figure 1 , the respective rules of Conmar, Winston Research, and Shellmar fit.
A. The Equilibrium under Conmar and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
Under Conmar and the default rule under the UTSA, the thief may freely use the trade secret at time t 2 , provided that the thief did not cause the public disclosure of the trade secret. Stated differently, the thief implicitly acquires knowledge of the trade secret at time t 1 at a royalty rate of zero, and he acquires the right to exploit the secret commercially at time t 2 , again at a royalty rate of zero. Thus, for a period of time equal to t 2 -t 1 , the thief enjoys a head start over lawful imitators, including those who discover the innovator's trade secret through their own entirely lawful investments in reverse engineering.
The trade secret thief is able to act on inside information at time t 1 , and he enjoys the benefits of asymmetric information with respect to the n-1 lawful imitators who can be expected to enter the market when information of the innovator's proprietary technology has entered the public domain. In this respect, the thief's head start in using the trade secret resembles insider trading of securities: In both cases, the person profits-relative to all n-1 other actors in the market-from the unauthorized use of material, nonpublic information that he did not create.
If the lag required for lawful imitators to bring a product to market (that is, t 3 -t 2 ) is greater than the thief's head start (that is, t 2 -t 1 ), then Conmar enables the trade secret thief, who by assumption has access to the same production technology as lawful imitators, to market an imitation product immediately at time t 2 . Thus, for the period between time t 2 and time t 3 , the secret thief and the innovator would divide the market as Cournot duopolists. Price for the product embodying the still-undisclosed trade secret would decline from the Schumpeterian monopoly level to the level for a two-firm Cournot equilibrium, which necessarily would be significantly higher than the n-firm Cournot equilibrium. The Cournot duopoly would cut the innovator's ability to earn quasi-rents in half, relative to the Schumpeterian monopoly equilibrium.
At the same time, however, the thief would be able to earn significant economic rents until time t 3 : The thief's marginal cost of using the innovator's proprietary technology would be zero by virtue of his trade secret misappropriation, which by definition entails no payment of royalties to the innovator on a per-unit (or any other) basis. Furthermore, the thief's other marginal costs would equal the innovator's, by assumption. Under these circumstances, Conmar creates a powerful incentive for a person to steal a trade secret, provided that he can conceal the theft and defer marketing a product embodying the secret until the moment that the innovator has disclosed the secret or an imitator has lawfully reversed engineered the product.
Consider now the earlier analysis of trade secret misappropriation as a real option. The trade secret thief acquires a real option. At time t 1 he acquires the "right" to use the innovator's then-secret technology at a royalty rate of zero if the innovator's further R&D efforts confirm (as manifested in product marketing or a patent application) the commercial potential of the technology at time t 2 , or if a third-party imitator's own investments in reverse engineering of the innovator's trade secret confirm the commercial potential of the technology, also at time t 2 . The trade secret thief acquires a secondmover advantage relative to the innovator and a "third-mover" advantage relative to the lawful imitator.
Courts applying Conmar have failed to anticipate and accommodate Kewanee's subsequent message that trade secret protection should reward innovation. Conmar and its progeny emphasize that commercial moralitynot the encouragement of innovation-is the concern of trade secret law. This conclusion reflects the underlying premise in Conmar that trade secret law rests on tort and contract principles, not property principles. Not surprisingly, courts rejecting the property law premise for trade secret protection have framed injunctive relief in a manner that is ill-suited to advancing Kewanee's objective of promoting innovation.
This misdirection is understandable. Courts have no expertise with which to identify the optimal rate of technological change or the optimal amount of resources that society should encourage to be committed to R&D through the vehicle of trade secret protection. 67 Two factors contribute to this lack of expertise. First, the unpredictability of R&D implies that a court cannot 67 . This problem has long been recognized and is endemic to all public policies designed to encourage the production of information. determine ex post how substantial an insurance system a trade secret remedy would have had to have been ex ante to have induced the innovator to produce a given trade secret.
68 Second, changes in the level of secret innovation are by definition unobservable. Therefore, it should not be surprising that, lacking such expertise, courts instead focus on legal questions that they may be more competent or comfortable to answer-but questions nonetheless that may be tangential to the economic incentives that trade secret remedies create for innovation.
Conmar suffers from these deficiencies. "Courts have been accustomed to speak of trade secrets as property," wrote Judge Learned Hand for the Second Circuit in 1949 in Conmar, "and at times to deal with them as if they were." 69 This approach he considered "permissible and to some extent desirable" in cases where the trade secret thief acquired the information "by some wrongful means, like breaking into a factory, or copying formulae or blue prints." 70 However, relying on Masland, Judge Hand concluded that if "the dispute turns, as it does here, upon whether the wrongdoer has acquired a secret from the employee who has himself acquired it lawfully, the wrong consists in inducing him to break his contract, or to be disloyal to a confidence reposed in him; and in either case it is a species of tortrecognized now for over a century-of inducing an obligor to default upon an obligation." 71 After construing the employment contract in question and finding no clause prohibiting the employee from disclosing information after the relevant patent issued, Judge Hand refused to conclude that "a wrongful inducement to divulge the disclosure before issue [of the patent] should deprive the wrongdoer of his right to avail himself of the patentee's dedication" of his proprietary information to the public in return for a patent. 72 Consequently, the Second Circuit refused to apply the Shellmar rule. 73 68. Cf. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, supra note 46, at 416 (discussing economic studies of the "ex ante probability of technical success" in research and development).
69. 172 F.2d at 155. 70. Id. 71. Id. One commentator, writing in 1962, described Conmar as embodying "the conception of a trade secret as something protectable only by a relationship between discloser and disclosee based on confidence or contract. Without the relationship there is nothing, and once the secret is public, confidence must end because there is nothing over which the parties can behave in confidence, and there can be no confidence if the discloser is not at the mercy of the good faith of the disclosee." See TURNER, supra note 2, at 453-54.
72. 172 F.2d at 156; see also Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 637 (2d Cir. 1942) (Hand, J.).
73. 172 F.2d at 155-56. One commentator has suggested that Conmar may be read narrowly as being "limited to secrets dedicated by the discloser to the public, and it states that the Shellmar cases are limited to penalizing disclosees who not only improperly use the secret, but improperly obtain it. Both these limitations are absent from some of the cases in each respective line of decision." See TURNER, supra note 2, at 444 (emphasis suppressed). Judge Hand's opinion in Conmar suggests that the duration of a trade secret injunction ought to be a function of the method by which the trade secret was misappropriated, rather than a function of how the valuable information benefits its users, how it was discovered, and ultimately how its misappropriation will influence incentives for innovation. This proposition conflicts with the Supreme Court's subsequent rationale in Kewanee. As in Conmar, the misappropriation at issue in Kewanee resulted from the breach of a confidential relationship. The Second Circuit's refusal in Conmar to recognize a property interest and to enjoin the thief's use of the valuable information failed to encourage innovation in the manner that Kewanee eventually specified twenty-five years later. Only in an outrageous casewhen the thief accomplishes his misappropriation by means of "breaking into a factory or copying formulae or blue prints" 74 -would Conmar deliver the protection that Kewanee considered essential to encouraging every form of innovation.
Judge Hand's reasoning is flawed on another economic ground. Unlike a contractual relationship, the theft of a trade secret is an involuntary transaction. It deprives the innovator of his opportunity cost in parting with the trade secret. If the innovator had a contractual relationship with the thief, then the theft of the trade secret also (and equivalently) denies the innovator his expectation interest under the contract. The proper objective of the remedy for theft of the trade secret should be to replicate the outcome of voluntary exchange, which would ensure for the innovator that he would receive the full opportunity cost of the trade secret when sharing it with the thief. 75 That opportunity cost is equivalent to the innovator's expectation interest measure of damages for breach of contract.
The aggregate social cost of following the Conmar rule may be substantial because it is the default injunction rule in the forty-six jurisdictions that have adopted the UTSA as of mid-2004. Given this special significance of Conmar, it is worth investigating the possibility that the Second Circuit silently retreated from that decision long ago, leaving a lesser precedent than meets the eye.
The Second Circuit decided Franke v. Wiltschek in 1953. 76 The case involved two salesmen who represented a manufacturer of compressed perfumed face cloths were shown a secret manufacturing process. The two later misappropriated and used the process to manufacture and sell a similar product. The district court enjoined the former salesmen from "making and selling full-sized face cloths compressed and sold as hard perfumed cylinders." 77 Notwithstanding that it had decided Conmar only four years earlier, the Second Circuit affirmed the perpetual injunction without any citation to Conmar, rejecting the argument that "relief should be limited to damages or to an injunction only during the period until the trade by legitimate means has caught up with the plaintiffs and their secret has become general." 78 The decision is even more remarkable in light of the fact that both Conmar and Franke were applications of New York common law in diversity jurisdiction, and one judge sat on both panels. 79 The Second Circuit concluded in Franke that even if the novelty of the trade secret is "slight and discoverable by a good mechanic . . . the authorities do not justify such uncertain, but presumably limited relief." 80 In considering the "good mechanic" argument in Franke, the Second Circuit observed that "[t]he suggestion for a more limited remedy appears to come from a single sentence at the end of Comment b" 81 of section 757 of the Restatement of Torts:
There, after a lengthy discussion of protection for trade secrets in unexceptional form and definitely in accord with the cases cited above, with indeed stress upon the protection as "against breach of faith" rather than "reward to the inventor," as in the case of the "patent monopoly," the suggestion is added that, if "the secret consists of mechanical improvements that a good mechanic can make without resort to the secret, the wrongdoer's liability may be limited to damages, and an injunction against future use of the improvements made with aid of the secret may be inappropriate." The tentative and conditional nature of the suggestion is obvious on its face.
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In this respect, Franke shows the Second Circuit declining to reaffirm its previous application of Conmar as an interpretation of New York common law and, instead, suggesting a rationale for lengthier trade secret injunctions But the greater problem with Forest is its premise that patent remedies and trade secret remedies are mutually exclusive. The trial court believed that, because the innovator had "dedicated his information to the public in return for a monopoly" when his patent was issued, it would be "inequitable" to give him "both a monopoly and a cause of action for subsequent disclosure" against the trade secret thief. 86 The misconception in Forest that an innovator cannot benefit from both trade secret protection and patent protection reveals the major flaw in the Conmar line of cases: Those cases fail to recognize and give legal significance to the distinction between ex ante incentives for innovation and ex post outcomes of the innovative process. The Forest trial court incorrectly based its election-of-remedies notion on the observation that, although the innovator "had previously kept this information secret (the sine qua non of a trade secret), he has now decided that it shall no longer be his knowledge alone." 87 This ex post perspective contradicts Kewanee's rationale that trade secret law is intended to foster innovation by providing a safety net for protecting information of uncertain or even doubtful patentability. Forest 83. The same year that the Second Circuit decided Franke, the Oregon Supreme Court applied Shellmar to design secrets revealed by the marketing of a product. McKinzie v. Cline, 197 Or. 184, 252 P.2d 564 (1953) . The court justified the perpetual injunction on the rationale that, "[i]f our system of private enterprise on which our nation has thrived, prospered and grown great is to survive, fair dealing, honesty and good faith between contracting parties must be zealously maintained." 197 Or. at 195, 252 P.2d at 569 (emphasis suppressed). In this respect, McKinzie anticipated Kewanee's premise that the enforcement of commercial morality, although important by itself, also is a means to promote the efficient allocation of resources within a competitive marketplace. failed to recognize that, to a firm investing in R&D, trade secret protection influences the expected benefits corresponding to one series of probabilistic outcomes of the innovative process; meanwhile, patent protection determines the expected benefits corresponding to a different series of probabilistic outcomes. If either series of expected benefits is diminished, the overall expected return to innovation-and, therefore, the level of sunk investment in innovative activity-will decline. Another decision in Conmar's lineage that fails to distinguish ex ante incentives to invest in innovation from ex post outcomes of the innovation process is Gallowhur Chemical Corp. v. Schwerdle, 88 a 1955 case in which two former employees of the innovator were alleged to have appropriated secret processes related to the solubility of phenyl mercuric acetate. The New Jersey state court framed the issue as "whether one who has learned and preserved the trade secret in confidence . . . shall be denied the same status as the rest of the public after the inventor has voluntarily removed the secret by applying for and obtaining letters patent thereon or by otherwise revealing the secret himself." 89 The court distinguished Shellmar on the ground that, unlike the present case, it presented an act of misappropriation that "clearly predated disclosure by patent issuance." 90 The court explicitly rejected any property basis for trade secret law, observing that "in the Shellmar case itself the relief was granted not to protect a property right but to penalize inequitable conduct."
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Such judicial reasoning also fails to distinguish between competitor welfare and consumer welfare, a distinction that is well recognized in antitrust law. For example, Judge Richard Posner has stated: "Competition is the allocation of resources in which economic welfare (consumer welfare, to oversimplify slightly) is maximized; it is not rivalry per se, or a particular form of rivalry, or some minimum number of competitors." 92 In a 1983 antitrust decision, he similarly wrote that "[t]he policy of competition is designed for the ultimate benefits of consumers rather than of individual competitors, and a consumer has no interest in the preservation of a fixed number of competitors greater than the number required to assure his being able to buy at the competitive price." 93 Gallowhur, which predated by two decades the economic restatement of antitrust law by the federal courts, is devoid of such reasoning or mooring in consumer welfare maximization. By focusing exclusively on commercial morality as the objective of trade secret law, Gallowhur in effect ignored that trade secret remedies influence the incentive to make sunk investment in innovative activity, which in turn has enormous benefits in terms of consumer welfare: "Assuming, as the facts here plainly show, that defendants respected plaintiffs' secret . . . though plaintiffs had themselves revealed it to the public; and assuming also, as is entirely possible, that plaintiffs' patents would upon judicial test be found to be invalid, would the law then be furthering the attainment of higher standards of commercial morality by permitting plaintiffs to enjoy a monopoly for which there was no legal or other sanction?" 94 The negative answer that the court obviously intimated by its rhetorical question rests on a misconception about the economics of innovation. The court failed to recognize that the thief received a head start over legitimate competitors that was equal in duration to the distance between time t 2 and time t 1 in Figure 1 . Consequently, the marginal effect of Gallowhur is to reduce the returns to legitimate reverse engineering. The court also exaggerated the benefits to the innovator from being able to enjoin the former employees: the competition from imitators who lawfully had gained access to the innovator's formerly secret information would suffice to constrain the innovator's exploitation of its tenuous "monopoly." In other words, the court ignored that supply substitutability would be high once the innovator's secret had entered the public domain.
After Kewanee and after the economic transformation of antitrust jurisprudence on "monopoly," this error of economic reasoning is all the more embarrassing because the courts committing it have done so ostensibly in the name of protecting consumers. In Hayes-Albion v. Kuberski, the Michigan Supreme Court in 1985 vacated a perpetual injunction against former employees who had misappropriated the innovator's trade secrets relating to the production of silicone rubber products used in hot stamp decorating. 95 Sounding more like Masland than Kewanee, the court declined to recognize a property right in trade secrets, holding instead that the innovator's right to relief is based on the fiduciary relationship between the employer and employee. 96 By limiting the injunction's duration "until such time as defendants can demonstrate that plaintiff's knowledge has become common knowledge," the court said it was protecting the "right of customers to choose their suppliers," which the court believed ought not to be restricted by the dispute between innovator and trade secret thief. 97 Implicitly, however, the court's characterization of the policy objective as being the protection of consumers' "right to choose their suppliers" necessarily subordinates (or simply ignores) the objective of encouraging risky sunk-cost investment in innovation by protecting the opportunity for innovators to earn quasi rents.
B. The Equilibrium under Winston Research
Under Winston Research, the trade secret thief may freely use the trade secret at time t 3 . The court enjoins the thief's use of the misappropriated secret only for as long as it would take an imitator to bring a product to market after lawfully learning the secret. Stated differently, the trade secret thief implicitly acquires knowledge of the trade secret at time t 1 at a royalty rate of zero, and he acquires the right to exploit the (former) secret commercially at time t 3 , again at a royalty rate of zero. This time frame assumes that a court would conclude that the trade secret thief could legitimately develop the trade secret as quickly as the first legitimate imitator could (that is, by time t 3 ). It might be unrealistic to suppose that the thief would be as swift as the most expeditious imitator, rather than the median imitator. But it is probably even more unrealistic to suppose that a court would delay the trade secret thief's entry significantly past time t 3 , given the rapid diffusion of information at that time to the n-1 other legitimate imitators poised to enter the market.
Winston Research rejects the polar rules of Shellmar and Conmar in favor of issuing an injunction of limited duration. Although this selfdescribed "head start" rule 98 may be appealing because it offers a compromise between divergent legal rules, it gives courts, without any useful guidance, the difficult task of trying to determine after the fact how long it would have taken a trade secret thief independently to have discovered something he already knows. project left 3M and joined Winston Research, which fourteen months later completed a machine with the same technical characteristics as 3M's. The federal district court enjoined Winston Research and the former 3M employees from using or disclosing the design specification for 3M's tape recorder for two years. The court reasoned that 3M's trade secrets "would shortly be fully disclosed, through no fault of Winston, as a result of public announcements, demonstrations, and sales and deliveries of [3M] machines." 100 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the two-year injunction, reasoning that a perpetual injunction "would subvert the public's interest in allowing technical employees to make full use of their knowledge and skill and in fostering research and development." 101 The court amplified this concern earlier in its opinion:
[R]estrictions upon the use and disclosure of . . . information [acquired in the course of a terminated employment relationship] limit the employee's employment opportunities, tie him to a particular employer, and weaken his bargaining power with that employer. Such restrictions interfere with the employee's movement to the job in which he may most effectively use his skills. They inhibit an employee from either setting up his own business or from adding his strength to a competitor of his employer, and thus they diminish potential competition. Such restrictions impede the dissemination of ideas and skills throughout industry. The burdens that they impose upon the employee and society increase in proportion to the significance of the employee's accomplishments, and the degree of his specialization. 102 At the same time, however, the court conceded that "denial of any injunction at all would leave the faithless employee unpunished where, as here, no damages were awarded; and he and his new employer would retain the 100. 350 F.2d at 141. 101. Id. at 142. 102. Id. at 137-38. Other courts have adopted approaches similar to Winston Research's "head start" rule. See, e.g., Sigma Chem. Co. v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371, 375 (8th Cir. 1986) ("extending the injunction beyond the time needed for independent development would give the employer a windfall protection and would subvert the public interest in fostering competition and in allowing employees to make full use of their knowledge and ability") (internal quotations omitted); Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410, 431 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (entering an injunction for sixteen months against Metric, which had misappropriated trade secrets relating to the manufacture of telephone cord armor, holding that a perpetual injunction would put Metric "out of business for all time, everywhere. This clearly is not necessary to make plaintiffs whole . . (1986) (upholding a perpetual injunction against trade secret thieves on grounds that the circumstances were sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive sanctions, but noting nevertheless that the thieves were "not foreclosed from doing business generally within this commercial field").
benefit of a head start over legitimate competitors who did not have access to the trade secrets until they were publicly disclosed."
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On economic grounds, Winston Research is superior to Conmar in the sense that it recognized the competitive consequences of the thief's head start and acknowledged that a tradeoff exists between encouraging innovation and preserving the mobility of specialized human capital. The court concluded that the best method for balancing these conflicting interests was a limited injunction: "By enjoining use of the trade secret for the approximate period it would require a legitimate [3M] competitor to develop a successful machine after public disclosure of the secret information, the district court denied the employees any advantage from their faithlessness, placed [3M] in the position it would have occupied if the breach of confidence had not occurred prior to the public disclosure, and imposed the minimum restraint consistent with the realization of these objectives upon the utilization of the employees' skills." 104 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged but refused to consider in Winston Research the policy concern that unless courts "protect . . . confidential but unpatented matter from disclosure," "private investment in such activities will be inhibited and progress will be slowed, with consequent loss to both employers and public." 105 In other words, the court clearly understood the safety-net argument that would underlie the Supreme Court's decision nine years later in Kewanee. The Ninth Circuit noted that "patent laws, it is argued, do not afford adequate protection because excessive time is required to process a patent application, and because a high standard of invention must be met to obtain a patent, or at least to sustain a patent once issued." Schulenberg v. Signatrol, Inc., 111 decided the same year as Winston Research, illustrates the difficulty of deterring trade secret theft through an injunction of limited duration. Schulenberg's former employees used illicit copies of the blueprints for his unpatented electric flasher to manufacture and sell a competing product. The flasher was relatively unsophisticated, but the blueprints nonetheless contained information regarding measurements, tolerances, and the quality of material that could not "ordinarily be discovered . . . without expensive and time-consuming analyses." 112 The trial court granted a perpetual injunction against the former employees' use of the blueprints, and the appellate court affirmed the judgment. )). Leading to this conclusion was the following preemption rationale: "The federal patent statutes require full disclosure of the invention as a condition to the grant of monopoly so that at the end of the period of monopoly the development may be freely available to all. Thus, the federal patent statutes would seem to reflect a congressional determination that any individual or social interests which may be served by secrecy are outweighed by those served by full disclosure. And it would seem to follow, under the rationale of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v 1964 ). The appellate court concluded: "We see no good purpose in condoning defendants' conduct by lifting the injunction. If defendants are now out of business they can only blame themselves. They were not born that way but got that way on their own." Id.
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, held that the injunction against Schulenberg's former employees "should have been limited in duration to the period of time reasonably required for defendants to legally produce . . . copies" by reverse engineering. 114 The court reasoned that a perpetual injunction would "not restrict its application as to time or geographical area," thereby putting the former employees "out of business for all time, everywhere."
115 This result was "clearly . . . not necessary to make plaintiffs whole," because other competitors already could copy Schulenberg's product lawfully by reverse engineering. 116 The court concluded that, because the former employees themselves lawfully could have reverse engineered Schulenberg's device in the same manner that his other competitors were free to do, it would be "difficult to justify" enjoining the former employees "for a period of time longer than that required to duplicate the product by lawful means." 118 were "inapposite" when the innovator's unpatentable product designs were copied not through the lawful means of reverse engineering but through "industrial espionage by employees who plan to organize a competing company."
119 Thus, Schulenberg stands in odd contrast to Winston Research. Constrained by Sears, the Ninth Circuit in Winston Research suggested that the ability to distinguish Sears would allow consideration of the safety-net argument, which in turn would imply a longer injunction than the two-year injunction issued by the trial court. On the other hand, the Illinois Supreme Court in Schulenberg distinguished Sears-but then shortened the injunction from one running in perpetuity to one limited in duration.
Schulenberg is flawed because it fails to penalize the trade secret thief. It merely returns the thief to the status quo ante. The former employee still may produce a competing product, having only incurred the time lag (and postponed any investment) necessary for reverse engineering. retains the valuable option implicit in the misappropriation of the trade secret. Given the trial-and-error nature of R&D, it is likely that at least some of the innovator's efforts ended in failure before arriving at a successful design or process. As a result of his misappropriation, however, the trade secret thief already knows which designs and processes are successful, and therefore he can avoid the expense of pursuing those failed research avenues. If the product does not have a short product life cycle-as Schulenberg's flasher evidently did not-a ready market will await the trade secret thief when the injunction expires. Unless accompanied by an award of punitive damages, the limited injunction in Schulenberg does not leave the former employee any worse off for having misappropriated his employer's trade secrets. Therefore, the injunction rule will fail to deter similar acts of misappropriation even when the probability of detection is certain-let alone when detection is uncertain.
Another case in the Winston Research family, Bryan v. Kershaw, 120 illustrates how courts have struggled to determine whether an injunction of some specified limited duration is superior to a perpetual injunction. In Bryan, the former chief engineer of R&D for Kershaw designed for his new employer a railroad track undercutter that was functionally identical to the undercutter that Kershaw was able to manufacture and market only after 4,000 to 5,000 man-hours of development. 121 The district court issued and the Fifth Circuit affirmed a limited injunction barring the former employee and his new employer from "duplicating, using or selling their undercutter" for a period of time "found necessary to remove the competitive advantage gained through the illegally used trade secrets." 122 The injunction, which extended until September 21, 1966, lasted at most thirty-three months. The Fifth Circuit's opinion does not state when the district court's decree took effect, but it does state that the former employee did not join his new employer until after "early 1964."
123
The Fifth Circuit heard Bryan because it was a diversity case. But neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Texas cases that it cited as authority indicated why the trade secret injunction had to be limited rather than perpetual in duration. With respect to the injunction against the former employee, the court held that "where an employee has in confidence gained information concerning a machine incorporating trade secrets and has divulged or attempts to divulge the same after the device has become public by some other means, the Texas law labels such conduct a breach of confidence and will enjoin the reaping of benefits there from. Shellmar. To the contrary, in each of the three Texas cases that the Fifth Circuit cited to support its holding, 125 the Texas court perpetually enjoined the trade secret thief. In one case, Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, the Texas Supreme Court strongly leaned toward the Shellmar approach by observing that when an innovator in a trade secret case "makes out a case for injunctive relief, the duty devolves upon the opposing party to show by competent evidence that an order of less duration than a permanent order will afford the injured party adequate protection."
126 In short, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Bryan does not provide any compelling rationale for why Winston Research is superior to Shellmar.
C. The Equilibrium under Shellmar
Under Shellmar, the trade secret thief is enjoined from time t 2 through time t 4 and beyond. The Shellmar rule arose when a trade secret thief sought to have modified an equitable decree perpetually enjoining him from making, using, or selling a wrapping material for food products, and from using or revealing the processes or machinery for making the wrap. The thief argued that the innovator's "right of secrecy was extinguished by the disclosures of the patents" subsequently issued for the wrapping inventions and that "equity will not continue injunctive relief to protect a right of secrecy which no longer exists." 127 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the perpetual injunction.
The Seventh Circuit's decision is most striking because it explicitly recognizes a property right in trade secrets, even though it believed that the equity jurisdiction to protect trade secrets "is founded upon trust and confidence." 128 The court said: "Whether the subject-matter is patentable or not, if the designer discovers and keeps secret a process of manufacture, though he will not have an exclusive right to it as against the public, after he shall have published it, or against those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it, yet he has a property right, which a court of chancery will protect against one who in bad faith and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it 125 to his own use." 129 In support of this reasoning, the court employed the legal fiction that the thief, "by its inequitable conduct had taken itself outside the pale of the general public to which disclosure of that patent was made." 130 Despite this emphasis, the property element of trade secrets seemed more important to the Seventh Circuit's rationale than confidentiality. The Seventh Circuit also hinted at the safety-net function of trade secret law. Quoting the district court's opinion approvingly, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the complementarity between property rights in patents and property rights in trade secrets: "The difference between secret processes and patents is that the owner of patent had a monopoly against all the world, while the owner of a secret process has no right 'except against those who have contracted, expressly or by implication, not to disclose the secret, or who have obtained it by unfair means.'" 131 Therefore, unlike Conmar, Shellmar rested on a property-rights view of trade secret law that comported, thirty-eight years later, with Kewanee and its objective of encouraging the efficient allocation of resources for innovation.
Although courts now routinely pay lip service to Kewanee's holding that trade secret law seeks to encourage innovation, they appear reluctant to embrace the full implications of their doing so. The older view of trade secret law-that it provides a remedy for breach of a confidential relationship-still leads some courts to view perpetual injunctions, like the one upheld by Shellmar, as punitive in nature, without considering the possibility of posttrial bargaining between the innovator and the trade secret thief.
Real option analysis would imply a rule somewhere between Winston Research and Shellmar. In other words, an injunction whose duration was calculated to reflect the option value of involuntary exchange would be longer than what Winston Research would imply and shorter than what Shellmar would imply. The transactions costs to litigants of making the precise calculation would be substantial, and the weighing of the relevance evidence associated with that calculation conceivably could exceed the competence of a trial court and, far more conceivably, the competence of a civil jury. It is therefore useful to ask whether a proxy rule exists.
In this regard, it is critical to recognize that even a perpetual injunction against a trade secret thief probably will not have the practical effect of precluding his use of the trade secret. More likely, the grant of a perpetual injunction merely will enable the innovator to enter post-trial licensing negotiations with the thief with greater relative bargaining power than if the court instead had ordered compulsory licensing of the proprietary information (or, worse, compulsory licensing at a court-ordered royalty rate). Put differently, a perpetual injunction is analogous to granting the innovator a patent for his trade secret that is enforceable only against the trade secret thief. Of course, Conmar represents the extreme case of compulsory licensing at a price equal to the court's lump sum damage award for the thief's unauthorized use from time t 1 to t 2 , and nothing more. 132 The polarity of Conmar and Shellmar-with Winston Research somewhere in between-illustrates the Coase Theorem. When the transactions costs of negotiation are low, these disparate rules have differing effects on the distribution of wealth between the innovator and the trade secret thief. But these disparate rules do not have differing short-run effects on the allocation of resources by altering the extent to which valuable information is disseminated for use. 133 At the litigation stage-when the innovator's foregoing expenditures on R&D all are sunk costs, and thus are irrelevant to his actions on the margin-all three rules will produce the identical allocation of resources. All three will result in the trade secret thief being able to use the trade secret, only at different prices. 134 However, it is not correct that all three rules will, in a dynamic sense, create identical incentives to make sunk investments to create valuable information. As predicted by the Coase Theorem, the three injunction rules will produce the same resource allocation outcome at a given snapshot in time. For present purposes, the relevant snapshot is the length of the current cycle of Schumpeterian rivalry-the period from t o to t 4 in Figure 1 . Across time, as producers and consumers move from one Schumpeterian cycle of innovation and competition to another, the Coasean neutrality of resource allocation under the three injunction rules will disappear. Just as industries subjected to compulsory patent licensing resort to secrecy rather than rely on 132 Apart from the option value of involuntary exchange, the probability of detecting trade secret theft also influences the appropriate duration of an injunction. An injunction for a misappropriated process secret differs from an injunction for a misappropriated design secret in the way that legal protection of the trade secret relates to Kewanee's objective of rewarding investment in innovative activity. Process secrets probably are easier to protect than are product design secrets, simply because the innovator can physically guard a secret process in his factory. In contrast, a product design is vulnerable to reverse engineering as soon as it is marketed. If the product is highly specialized and requires elaborate point-of-sale demonstration or a continuing customer-service relationship (as would a mainframe computer or an Internet router, for example), the innovator or his distributor may be able to screen purchasers and refuse to sell to any whose primary motive appears to be to reverse engineer the product. 136 Similarly, the innovator might impose a lease-only requirement, or condition a lease or warranty on the requirement that only authorized personnel may service the product. But these protective measures have their shortcomings and, in any case, quickly become prohibitively costly for a product that is widely marketed. Certainly, this is the case for mass-market consumer products as well.
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Although process secrets are probably easier to protect than are product secrets, their misappropriation (once it has occurred) is harder to detect. A misappropriated design ultimately manifests itself in a recognizable copy of the innovator's product. But a misappropriated process is not necessarily disclosed by the thief's marketing of a competing product. Furthermore, although the thief may be less creative than the innovator, he may be more skillful at concealing a valuable process, whether original or stolen. In light of these concerns, a second piece of economic intuition underlies the justification for a court's issuance of a perpetual injunction: the duration of a limited injunction (calculated as in Winston Research) must be divided by the ex ante probability that the innovator will ever detect the misappropriation. 138 If this adjustment for the probability of detection is not made, the cost to the trade-secret thief of a limited injunction would be insufficient to deter misappropriation. A perpetual term for the injunction is a rough approximation of this optimal duration. The perpetual term does not confer any windfall on the innovator. At any significant discount rate, the present value of licensing fees that the innovator could derive from the trade secret thief for use of the process during the perpetual term would not differ substantially from the present value of the royalty stream during the statutory patent term. Particularly in an industry in which substantial technological change occurs more rapidly than the duration of a patent, the value of a perpetual injunction against the thief would be roughly equivalent to the value of a patent license covering the same proprietary information. Neither form of intellectual property protection would have any practical value for the innovator after t 4 in Figure 1 . Instead, the value of both would be truncated by the Schumpeterian cycle of competition.
It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that, because the theft of a secret product design is more likely to be detected than the theft of a secret process, an injunction for the misappropriation of a design should be of limited rather than perpetual duration. This conclusion would presuppose that process secrets and product secrets have equivalent effects on the innovator's ability to earn quasi rent and economic rent. They do not. Misappropriation of a process secret erodes the innovator's upward pricing flexibility by increasing the elasticity of supply of rival firms, but it does not directly reduce consumer demand for the innovator's own product. On the other hand, the misappropriation of a product design enables the thief immediately to market a consumer substitute, thereby flattening the innovator's residual demand curve and reducing its upward pricing flexibility. 139 One would expect the theft of secret product designs to be more damaging to incentives to make sunk investment in innovation than the theft of secret processes, for the innovator's loss in upward pricing flexibility probably would be greater from the increase in demand substitutability than from an increase in producer substitutability.
An exception to this argument would arise when the misappropriation of constituent processes is so pervasive that the trade secret thief in effect has stolen the know-how to the innovator's entire business. The result in this case should be the same as for the theft of design blueprints: The thief's manufacture of a competing product must be enjoined perpetually. If the trade secret thief still considers it profitable to manufacture a copied product, he can negotiate with the innovator for a license. Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski 139. In the extreme case, a product design secret that confers upward pricing flexibility on its owner without affecting producer substitutability at all evokes concerns more reminiscent of trademark and state unfair competition laws than of the need to reward innovation that the Supreme Court emphasized in Kewanee.
in proprietary information. If the latter, why justify a perpetual injunction as appropriate punishment for wrongdoing rather than as the optimal means to restore correct incentives for innovation? Such a confusing synthesis of Kewanee and Masland is unlikely to promote either commercial ethics or sunk investment in innovation in a consistent manner.
Another curious example of legal-rule synthesis is Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 157 in which the Washington Supreme Court, applying the Conmar-style default rule in Washington's version of the UTSA, upheld a perpetual injunction on a rationale similar to that of Winston Research. A jury found that Sierracin had misappropriated trade secrets relating to the design of Boeing's replacement cockpit windows, and the trial court entered a permanent injunction against him. Sierracin appealed, arguing that the injunction was "perpetual and punitive." 158 The Washington Supreme Court rejected the argument and upheld the injunction. The court reasoned that Sierracin should not be allowed to profit from wrongful conduct. 159 The court further observed, in response to the argument that the injunction was perpetual, that the default Conmar rule in Washington's version of the UTSA "specifically allow [ed] Sierracin to apply to the superior court to have the injunction lifted when Boeing's trade secrets cease to exist." 160 Unlike Conmar, however, the Sierracin court recognized that one purpose of trade secret law is to protect an innovator's investments, for it observed that Boeing had invested $16 million in designing the windows. 161 Furthermore, the Washington Supreme Court appeared satisfied that the trial court reasonably doubted that Sierracin could ever have reverse engineered the design, thus using a Winston Research rationale. 162 Consequently, the Washington Supreme Court upheld an injunction that was effectively perpetual in duration. Yet, the question remains whether the court's rationale was based on the protection of the innovator's investment or on the fact that reverse engineering by Sierracin seemed unlikely. 912 (1962) , the Oregon Supreme Court, following Shellmar, enjoined the manufacture and sale of garbage truck bodies that incorporated ideas and inventions acquired by Kuhnau during a confidential relationship with the innovator, Kamin. Even though the facts established that the thief could have developed the innovator's design by reverse engineering, that competitors substantially had done so even before the thief had begun business, and that the thief's product differed from the innovator's in some respects, the court upheld a decree that perpetually enjoined the thief from making and selling any product incorporating the innovator's "ideas and inventions." 232 Or. at 143, 145, 149, 374 P.2d at 915, 917.
The analytical confusion in decisions such as Sierracin and Valco suggests how courts in other states that have adopted the UTSA might attempt to justify a longer injunction than the Conmar default rule would indicate. These future cases will have greater coherence if they base their analysis on the option value inherent in trade secret theft.
VII. CONCLUSION
The trade secret thief enjoys the valuable opportunity to "wait and see" whether investing in product development related to the secret is justified. He also knows in advance that certain lines of R&D are unlikely to be fruitful, and thus he can avoid the sunk cost of investing in drilling those dry holes. The three conflicting rules for calculating the duration of injunctions for the misappropriation of trade secrets create different incentives not only for sunk investment in innovative activity, but also for the misappropriation of trade secrets. In addition, for each of the three conflicting rules, the nature and magnitude of these incentives differ as between process secrets and design secrets.
Serious inefficiencies attend Judge Learned Hand's Conmar rule, which bars an injunction against a trade secret thief after public disclosure of the information. The Winston Research rule limits the duration of the injunction to the length of time that it would have taken the trade secret thief to reverse engineer the secret design or process. This approach fails to recognize the full value of the real option that the thief received when he misappropriated the trade secret. Courts could refine the Winston Research approach by explicitly considering the option value of involuntary exchange. In other words, the more valuable the option, the longer would be the injunction. In practice, however, such a calculation would be difficult for litigants to produce and courts to evaluate. Clearly, the duration of the injunction would be longer than under the current Winston Research approach. Introducing explicit consideration of the probability of detection would further extend the injunction term.
Recognizing that the issuance of the injunction will be followed by Coasean bargaining between the innovator and the thief, and recognizing further that the duration of the injunction will affect the relative bargaining power of the two parties but not the likelihood that they will undertake such negotiations, it would be more efficient for courts simply to apply the Shellmar rule of granting a perpetual injunction against the trade secret thief. Of the three injunction rules, Shellmar most closely reflects the value of the real option inherent in trade secret misappropriation. In this respect, Shellmar is most consistent with the objective, enunciated by the Supreme Court in Kewanee, of preserving incentives to make sunk investments for the creation of valuable information.
